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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON EXECUTIVE PAY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Thuong Quang Nguyen
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand

Two essays of this dissertation study the relationship between executive compensation
and firm performance. These essays analyze both compensation level and compensation
structure, and focus not only on CEO compensation but also on Top Management Team
(TMT) compensation as well as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) compensation.
Methodologically, these essays use different regression techniques to explore the nature
of time series over cross sections of executive compensation data in order to find a
reliable relationship between executive compensation and firm performance.

The first essay investigates the TMT compensation - firm performance relationship and
finds that the compensation dispersion among TMT members is positively and
statistically associated with firm

performance measured by Tobin's Q. This result

strongly supports the tournament effect hypothesis and not the equity fairness hypothesis.
The effect of TMT total compensation on firm

performance is also positive and

significant, even after controlling for CEO compensation. The second essay is one of the
first studies investigating how CFO pay structure relates to firm performance and finds a
positive and significant relationship between CFO stock options and firm performance.
Even more, the impact of CFO pay structure is statistically stronger than the effect of
CEO compensation structure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation overview

Executive compensation refers to the pay managers receive from the company in the
form of salary, bonuses, stock options, among other components. Executive
compensation is a crucial part of corporate governance, and it plays an important role in
corporate finance. As a consequence, executive compensation receives increasing
attention in both the academic and the practical world. Historically, before the 1980s the
number of research studies in executive compensation is very limited, and since 1980s
the number of studies in this field begins to increase exponentially (Murphy 1999).

While researchers have used multiple theories in the executive compensation literature,
agency theory, introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is the first and the most
widely used. The agency theory proposes that executives try to maximize their gain from
the firms; they work mainly for their own interests and benefits, and not for shareholders'
wealth. Executive compensation represents a good opportunity to study this problem
because executive compensation reflects most of the incentives of the executives.

In executive compensation literature, other theories are also employed such as industrial
organizational economics theory: regulation and compensation (Hubbard and Palia 1995),
strategic interaction (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999), sociology and organizational
behavior: social comparisons and wage dispersion effects (Hambrick and Cannella 1993;
O'Reilly, Main and Crystal 1988).
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There is a large debate in the literature about the efficiency of executive pay, especially
CEO pay. Various researchers claim that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) receive
excessive payment packages even when their firms do not perform well (Harris 2009),
while others show that it is not the case as they find that CEO compensation is positively
associated with firm performance (Edmans and Gabaix 2009). The debate has continued
during and after the recent global financial crisis (Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann 2010).

Level and composition of executive compensation

Murphy (1999) provides a comprehensive overview of executive compensation from the
viewpoint of labor economists. Executive compensation, or executive pay, consists of a
base salary, bonuses, stock options, and other components such as restricted stocks, longterm incentive plans, and retirement plans, among others. The executive compensation
level refers to the total compensation that managers receive from the companies. The
executive compensation structure, or pay composition, refers to the portion of base
salary, bonus, and stock options in executive compensation level. Level and composition
of executive compensation are objects of two main research streams in executive
compensation and receive much attention in the literature.

In the first essay, I investigate the relationship between executive compensation level and
firm performance, also known as the pay-for-performance relationship in the finance
literature. While most studies in the pay-for-performance literature deal with CEO
compensation, I focus my research on the compensation of Top Management Team
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(TMT) and investigate whether and how the TMT compensation influences firm
performance after controlling for CEO compensation.

In the second essay, I explore the relationship between the executive compensation
structure and firm performance. While most current research focuses on CEO pay
structure, my research pays more attention on the effect of the structure of Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) compensation on firm performance. As the CFO is a powerful
executive who is responsible for financial risk and directly makes the corporate financial
decisions, I propose a significant relationship between CFO pay structure and firm
performance, even after controlling for the influence of CEO pay structure.

TMT pay for performance

Most of the previous studies in executive compensation literature focus on CEO
compensation (Edmans and Gabaix 2009; Firth, Fung and Rui 2006; Hubbard and Palia
1995; Murphy 1999). On the one hand, it is true that CEOs play a very important role in
corporate decision, and it is worthwhile investigating the influence of CEOs on firm
performance in order to find the optimal executive compensation policy for firms.

On the other hand, today no one individual can scan all aspects of the business and
environment of the firm because of the complex nature of the decision-making process in
business; no one can have sufficient knowledge and information in a very fast changing
economy (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Hence, the role of top executives in the company
as a team, or Top Management Team (TMT), is gaining increasing importance in the

4

success of the firms, and the number of research studies committed to investigate and
understand this role is also increasing very quickly, especially in the management science
research (Hambrick and Mason 1984).

TMT is much more widely studied in the management literature than in the finance
literature. The TMT includes top executives of the firm such as the president, CEO, and
CFO, among other senior managers. Management researchers focus their investigation
mainly on the tendency of TMT demographic characteristics such as age, gender, tenure,
experience, and background of TMT members and/or the dispersion of these
demographic characteristics. Many of them find a significant association between firm
performance and TMT demographic characteristics tendency/dispersion.

In the executive compensation research, the number of studies in TMT compensation is
still limited, although there are several potential research directions in this topic. For
example, similar to general TMT research in management, TMT compensation research
may investigate the compensation of the team as a whole in terms of compensation level,
and compensation structure and explore how this TMT compensation affects firm
activities and decisions.

TMT compensation research may also investigate the compensation dispersion among the
members of TMT and its influences on firm characteristics on making decisions. In terms
of the effect of compensation dispersion on firm performance, there are two opposite
hypotheses in the literature: the tournament hypothesis and the equity fairness hypothesis.
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The tournament hypothesis proposes that an increase in compensation dispersion
motivates the competition among executives and thus increases firm performance (Kale,
Reis and Venkateswaran 2009; Lee, Lev and Yeo 2008). The equity fairness hypothesis
proposes the opposite: the lower the compensation dispersion among executives the
better they work for the firm and then the higher performance the firm achieves (Akerlof
and Yellen 1988; Drago and Garvey 1998; Milgrom 1988).

The first essay of my dissertation studies how the TMT compensation is associated with
firm performance considering both compensation level and compensation dispersion
simultaneously. The results will provide empirical evidence to support the tournament
hypothesis or the equity fairness hypothesis. Another important feature of this research
when studying the effect of TMT total compensation is the use of CEO compensation as
a control variable to make sure that TMT compensation impact is actual and sound.

CFO compensation structure and firm performance

While the first essay investigates the effect of executive compensation level on firm
performance, the second essay will focus on the impact of executive compensation
structure. These two essays are complementary and together they provide a more
complete view about the effect on firm performance of executive compensation in terms
of both compensation level and compensation structure.

The CEO is the highest-level officer in charge of the total management of the
corporation. The CEO's responsibilities vary across firms and industries. His/her core
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duty is generally to facilitate the corporate development to achieve the corporate central
objective. It is natural that the CEO has influence on financial decisions as they are very
important for corporate development, and most researchers in the literature explore the
relationship between CEO compensation structure and firm performance (Murphy 1999).

In practice, the CFO is the officer responsible mainly for managing corporate financial
decisions such as corporate financial
management, and financial

planning, financial

investments, financial

risk

reporting. Although CFOs directly manage corporate

financial decisions, the literature studying the influence of CFOs on corporate financial
decisions is still very limited (Burns and Kedia 2008; Chava and Purnanandam 2010;
Fuller and Jensen 2002; Jiang, Petroni and Yanyan 2010). In particular, the number of
research works on CFO compensation structure is much more limited than the number of
CEO compensation studies.

On the policy making side, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did
recognize the increasingly important role of the CFO in corporate finance. In the 2002
Sarbanes - Oxley Act, the SEC requires that both the CEO and CFO take ownership for
their financial statements, meaning that both the CEO and CFO are responsible for the
accuracy of the financial statements of their firms. Regarding the executive compensation
issue, the SEC also requires new disclosures on CFO compensation since 2006, and the
CFO compensation data has been available in the ExecuComp database since 2006.
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2. TMT PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
2.1 Literature review

CEO compensation and firm performance

Before the 1980s, the number of research works in executive compensation is very
limited (Ciscel and Carroll 1980; Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Roberts 1956).
Researchers focus mostly on study cases and the studies are limited in terms of both data
availability and theoretical background. From the years of the 1980s, with the
development of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), executive compensation
begins to receive an increasing interest in finance literature, and as a consequence, the
number of studies in this field increases exponentially (Coughlan and Schmidt 1985;
Jensen and Murphy 1990; Leonard 1990; Murphy 1985), and most of these research
papers focus on CEO compensation only.

Murphy (1999) provides a comprehensive review of executive compensation from the
point of view of labor economics. He summarizes the executive compensation research
both theoretically and empirically, analyzes both level and structure of CEO
compensation and their association with firm performance, and points out some
differences in compensation among countries and regions over the world. Murphy
investigates the relationship between CEO pay and performance in the sense how firm
performance and its measure influence CEO pay. Murphy also summarizes the concept of
pay-performance sensitivity, which is measured by the coefficient of performance in the
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regression of CEO pay on firm performance as the main independent variables and other
control variables. Murphy finds that the total pay-performance sensitivities depend on
firm size and vary from industry to industry, and these sensitivities are driven mainly by
stock options incentives.

On an international scale, researchers also study characteristics of executive
compensation in many other counties over the world such as the UK (Conyon 1997; Cosh
and Hughes 1997), Japan (Kato 1997; Kato and Rockel 1992), Germany (Kaplan 1994),
Canada (Zhou 2000), and recently China (Firth, Fung and Rui 2006; Groves, Yongmiao,
McMillan and Naughton 1995).

Conyon (1997) investigates the effect of corporate governance innovations on executive
pay of large companies in the UK. He finds that executive pay is positively associated
with current shareholders' wealth but not the wealth of predated shareholders, and
governance variables do play a role in executive pay. Other researchers (Cosh and
Hughes 1997) find a positive association between executive compensation and
shareholder wealth as well as firm size.

Regarding executive compensation study in Japan, researchers find that the CEOs of
keiretsu, a typical grouping of enterprises in Japan, earn less than the CEOs of
independent companies (Kato 1997). In this research, they also provide the empirical
evidence that the monitoring role of the banks as institutional stakeholders becomes more
important in the practices of corporate governance in Japan.
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Executive pay in China may display an interesting example of an important emerging
country in the literature. Some researchers (Groves, Yongmiao, McMillan and Naughton
1995) study the managerial labor market in China during the reform process in the years
of the 1990s and find that Chinese managerial labor market incorporates many incentives
suggested

by competitive labor markets in

developed countries. Managerial

compensation is strongly linked to firm performance in terms of profitability, but this link
is somewhat weaker in terms of sales.

More recently, other researchers (Firth, Fung and Rui 2006) investigate the relationship
between corporate performance and CEO compensation in China and show that Chinese
firms listed in stock exchanges normally have controlling shareholders, and different
kinds of controlling shareholders have different impact on executive pay. Specifically,
firms with State agency as the controlling shareholder do not use performance-based pay
while firms with private block holders as major shareholders focus on firm performance
when setting executive compensation.

One of the difficulties of doing comparative research in executive compensation is the
issue of data availability. The data from developing countries is very limited and
unreliable. Technically, data from different countries have very different format and it is
difficult to integrate them in an executive compensation study. This technical problem
exists among all countries, but is more notable in the developing world.
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Overall, there are notable differences in the practices of executive compensation across
countries over time, as well as across firms and industries (Murphy 1999). It makes
international research in executive compensation more difficult.

Top Management Team theory

Hambrick and Mason (1984) are two of the first authors in management science
investigating the "upper echelons" theory that refers to an organization as a reflection of
its top managers. In the essence of the upper echelon theory, they propose that the
strategic choices and performance of the organization can be predicted partially by the
background and characteristics of their management team.

Following the "upper echelons" theory, researchers in the management field investigate
the impact of TMT demographic characteristics on firm performance (Auden, Shackman
and Onken 2006; Hambrick and D'Aveni 1992). Most of these TMT studies focus on the
tendency and/or dispersion of these demographic characteristics of TMT members, and
they do generally find

some significant relationships between TMT demographic

characteristics and firm performance.

Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) investigate the relationship between TMT characteristics
and firm failure in large bankruptcies and find that TMT weakness, through strategic
mistakes and stakeholder uneasiness with TMT, causes firm deterioration; and that
corporate deterioration brings TMT deterioration through different means. Auden and
colleagues (Auden, Shackman and Onken 2006) provide empirical support for the
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proposition that TMT is a suitable unit of analysis regarding its effect on firm
performance.

On the one hand, the relation between TMT tendency and firm performance is somewhat
consistent in the management literature. Most studies in management literature find that
the tendency of demographic characteristics such as age, background, skill, and tenure of
TMT members does statistically significantly influence firm

performance (Auden,

Shackman and Onken 2006; Carmeli and Tishler 2006; Koufopoulos, Zoumbos,
Argyropoulou and Motwani 2008).

On the other hand, the association between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance is
mixed (Cannella Jr, Park and Lee 2008). Cannella and colleagues (Cannella Jr, Park and
Lee 2008) find the positive relationship between TMT functional diversity and firm
performance. Some studies find a positive association (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
1990; Norburn and Birley 1988); other studies find no significant association between
TMT heterogeneity and firm performance (West and Schwenk 1996); some others even
find a negative relationship between them (Simons, Pelled and Smith 1999; Wei, Lau,
Young and Wang 2005).

The literature also shows a positive three-way interaction between customer orientation,
TMT functional diversity, and TMT experience diversity on organizational performance.
Researchers (Wei, Lau, Young and Wang 2005) demonstrate a negative relationship
between TMT education heterogeneity and experience heterogeneity with firm
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performance. Others (Olson, Parayitam and Twigg 2006) find a negative relationship of
age diversity and positive relationship of functional heterogeneity with strategic choice,
they also find support for the upper echelons theory.

TMT compensation and firm performance

The literature on the relationship between TMT compensation and firm performance is
still very limited. The study of Carpenter and Sanders (2002) is one of these few research
papers studying the effect of TMT compensation level on firm performance. They find a
positive relation between CEO pay and TMT pay. TMT compensation does predict firm
performance when aligned with shareholder interest and internal contingencies, and the
impact of CEO pay on firm performance depends on TMT pay. In other words, they do
not study the direct association between TMT compensation and firm performance but
propose TMT compensation as a missing link between CEO compensation and the
performance of the company.

Regarding the effect of TMT compensation dispersion on firm performance, there are
two different theories in the literature: the tournament effect and the equity fairness
effect. The tournament effect hypothesis proposes that the wider the pay difference
among TMT members, the stronger the competition incentive among these members in
order to be promoted is, and the higher the performance the firm achieves (Kale, Reis and
Venkateswaran 2009; Lee, Lev and Yeo 2008). Specifically, the tournament incentives,
measured by the distance or dispersion of compensation figures between the CEO and
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other executives, are positively associated with firm performance. Moreover researchers
find that the association is stronger when a CEO is near his/her retirement and weaker
when a new CEO is just appointed, this association is even weaker when the new CEO is
outside (Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran 2009).

Similarly, Lee and colleagues (Lee, Lev and Yeo 2008) find empirical support for the
tournament hypothesis. In this research, the authors also document that the positive
relationship between TMT pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger for firms with
high agency costs, and effective governance practices such as board independence
increases this important relationship.

On the other hand, the equity fairness hypothesis proposes the opposite: Companies can
achieve better performance by minimizing the pay dispersion among TMT members
(Akerlof and Yellen 1988; Milgrom 1988). Some researchers provide empirical evidence
that supports this argument. For example, Drago and Garvey (1998) investigate a sample
of Australian companies and find the evidence supporting that the fairness in pay does
have a positive effect on firm performance. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) also investigate
the effect of pay dispersion among academic faculties and find that this compensation
dispersion negatively affect faculty performance in terms of research satisfaction, and
suggest that the dispersion in compensation produces an adverse impact on performance
in higher education.
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Carpenter and Sander (2004), in other research, study the effects of TMT compensation
and firm internationalization on multinational corporation performance and find positive
effects of non-CEO pay on future performance of the firms, but negative effects of the
gap between CEO compensation and TMT compensation on multinational corporate
performance. This finding is somewhat different than what they find earlier (Carpenter
and Sanders 2002), and shows a clear signal that the debate between tournament
hypothesis and equity fairness hypothesis may continue.

Gaps in the literature

The first notable gap of the current literature is that most research papers focus mainly on
CEO compensation. Among those few articles investigating TMT compensation, the
researchers focus only on one aspect of executive compensation such as total
compensation or compensation dispersion of top executive members. They do not
investigate the effect of both aspects concurrently.

Another limitation of the current literature is that most researchers do not control for the
effect of CEO compensation on firm performance. Without controlling for the CEO
effect, we cannot confirm the existence of the association between TMT compensation
and firm performance. The association between TMT compensation and firm
performance, if found in the analysis, may be a consequence of the actual relationship
between CEO compensation and firm performance as firms may tend to pay CEO and
TMT members proportionally. This essay covers these gaps of the literature by exploring
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the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation of TMT in terms
of both terms of compensation level and structure, and provides further empirical
evidence for the debate between two opposite theories: the tournament hypothesis and the
equity fairness hypothesis.

Research question and hypotheses

Covering these gaps of the literature, the first essay investigates the main research
question of whether and how TMT compensation relates to firm performance. Again, I
will also study whether the relationship between TMT compensation and firm
performance is still significant after controlling for the impact of CEO compensation.

Analyzing the main question, this essay hypothesizes that TMT compensation in terms of
total pay and pay dispersion is associated significantly with firm performance, and that
this association is still statistically significant when we include CEO compensation in the
model. If the empirical evidence supports this hypothesis, we can suggest that TMT
compensation is an important factor in the study of executive pay-performance
relationship. By answering the main research question, this essay also provides empirical
evidence for the debate between two opposite hypotheses: the tournament effect
hypothesis or the equity fairness hypothesis.
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2.2 Data and methodology

Data

I collect executive compensation data from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp
database. This database provides comprehensive executive compensation data for 1500
S&P firms each year from 1992 to 2010, including S&P 500, S&P Midcap and S&P
Smallcap index firms. This list changes from year to year allowing some companies to
exit from the S&P classified list of firms and other companies to enter the list. This essay
requires the availability of compensation data for at least three executives in the firm's
TMT and compensation data of the CEO for each firm-year observation.

For each firm-year research unit in my sample, I collect the compensation data for all
executives in the database such as the president, CEO, vice president, and CFO, among
others. In general, Standard and Poor's ExecuComp includes the data for five top
executives of the companies every year. Together with the compensation data, the
ExecuComp database also provides basic accrual and financial

data at firm

level,

including sales, assets, dividend payment, return on equity, and return on assets...

Table 1 summarizes the description of the ExecuComp database and its main data used in
both essays of this dissertation.

[Insert table 1 here]
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Variables

Dependent variable:

Firm performance is the main dependent variable of the analysis. While many previous
studies use Return on Assets as a measure of firm performance, this measure also
receives many critics in the literature. Some possible disadvantages are that total assets
and return on assets are based on historical cost, while firm performance should be based
on current dollars; Also, firm performance focuses on operating assets while returns on
assets are based on not only operating assets but also on total assets (Barber and Lyon
1996). Following Kale (Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran 2009) and other researchers, I use
Tobin's Q as the measure of firm performance in the main analysis. Firms with high
Tobin's Q ratio tend to have attractive investment opportunities and competitive
advantage. I estimate Tobin's Q as the market value of equity plus book value of debt
divided by book value of total assets. I also use Earnings per Share (EPS) as a measure of
firm performance for robustness check purpose.

Independent variables:

I calculate independent variables related to TMT compensation from annual
compensations of all executives on the ExecuComp database for a firm in a specific year.
I collect Total Compensation data item (TDC2) as executive compensation of a senior
manager in a specific year, which is the summation of salary, bonus, value of options
exercised, restricted stock grants, and other items. Some studies in the literature select the
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compensations of only three or four executives from the database (Carpenter and Sanders
2002). This approach may lose some valuable data and does not reflect the complete
information ofTMT compensation.

In this essay, I compute TMT total pay as the logarithm of the summation of all
individual executive compensations of a firm in a specific year. TMT mean pay is the
logarithm of the compensation mean of all individual executives. We can observe that
CEO compensation data also contributes in this calculation of TMT pay variables. TMT
pay dispersion is the ratio of the compensation standard deviation divided by the
compensation mean of all TMT members of a firm in a year. I require that the number of
TMT members of a firm in a specific year should be at least three so that the TMT pay
dispersion is meaningful in our analysis.

Figure 1 plots CEO pay, TMT total pay and TMT mean pay over the 1992-2010 period
and over all 2-digit SIC industries. Overall, we can observe that CEO pay, TMT total
pay, and TMT mean pay are highly and positively correlated. The executive
compensation tends to increase over time while this compensation differs from industry
to industry. Thus, I will have to deal with the potential problem of multicollinearity
carefully in the next sections.

[Insert figure 1 here]
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Control variables:

CEO compensation is the most important control variable. Many of previous studies
ignore this control variable when investigating the effect of TMT compensation on firm
performance. As a result, we cannot confirm the actual existence of the relationship
between TMT compensation and firm performance. I select CEO compensation from the
ExecuComp database by computing the logarithm of annual compensation data of an
executive of each firm with the Annual CEO Flag.

Firm specific control variables such as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash
flows, sales growth are also collected from ExecuComp database. Specifically, firm size
is the logarithm of the firm total assets. Leverage is the ratio of equity book value divided
by equity market value. The book to market ratio is the ratio of common equity divided
by market value. Free cash flow is the operating income before depreciation divided by
total assets. Finally, sales growth is the sales percent change in one year. This use of
logarithm and standardized variables reduces the potential problem of nonstationarity.

I also winsorize the data to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers by excluding
observations with the values of variables such as Tobin's Q, firm size, leverage, free cash
flows, sales growth, and book to market at the 1 percentile of the sample data.

For illustration purpose, I plot the Tobin's Q and Book to Market before the winsorizing
process in Figure 2:
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[Insert figure 2 here]

Similarly, in Figure 3,1 plot the Tobin's Q and Book to Market ratio before winsorizing
process:

[Insert figure 3 here]

Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the effectiveness of this winsorizing process for Tobin's Q
and book to market. We can observe notable outliers of Tobin's Q in panel A and outliers
of Book to Market in panel B. After winsorizing these variables, they are much smoother
as in figure 2. In the case of BTM variable, I also require that it take a positive value.

Industry performance, the only industry specific control variable in this essay, is the
performance mean of all firms in the same industry, classified by the two-digit SIC code
of the firms, in a specific year. All this data also comes from Standard and Poor's
ExecuComp database.

Table 2 provides details about definitions and computations of dependent variable,
independent variables as well as control variables.

[Insert table 2 here]
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Descriptive statistics

Summary statistics

I merge compensation related variables and finance based variables into a data sample for
regression analysis. This sample includes 26,951 firm-year observations of 3,075 firms in
66 industries over the period from 1992 to 2010.

Table 3 shows the summary statistics of all variables used in this essay: Firm
performance measured by Tobin's Q, TMT pay dispersion, TMT total pay, TMT mean
pay, CEO pay, firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, sales growth,
and industry's average performance.

[Insert table 3 here]

We observe no irregularity in the summary statistics of all dependent, independent, and
control variables used in this essay in terms of values such as number of observation,
mean, standard deviation, summation, minimum, and maximum. These results are due to
the process of winsorizing and transformation of variables,

Correlation coefficients

Table 4 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients among dependent, independent, and
control variables.
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[Insert table 4 here]

From this correlation coefficients' table we can observe that variable TMT total pay and
variable TMT mean pay are very highly correlated with a coefficient of about 98 percent.
It is a strong signal of a multicollinearity problem among studied dependent variables. I
need to fix it by excluding the TMT mean pay variable and keeping the TMT total pay
variable as one of the independent variables in this essay.

Research methodology

To investigate the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance,
many studies use the concept of "pay-performance sensitivity", this sensitivity is used to
investigate how firm performance influences the compensations of the firm's executives
(Murphy 1999). They run a regression of executive pay on firm performance and payperformance sensitivity is the coefficient of independent variable firm performance. The
simplest form of this type of regressions is

Executive Compensation = /?<? + /?/ Firm Performance

The literature also uses first different variables in the regressions:

A (Executive Compensation)

(Firm Performance)

In this essay, I use a slightly different approach. As the final goal of the firm is to
maximize the firm value and performance, I investigate how the executive pay influences
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the firm's performance. Executive compensation is effective if it is positively associated
with firm performance. In other words, the higher compensation the executives receive,
the higher the firm performance is.

I first run the regression of firm performance on all independent variables such as TMT
pay dispersion, TMT pay dispersion and CEO, controlling for all firm specific and
industry specific variables:

Firm performance = Po

+

pi TMT pay dispersion + P2 TMT total pay + P3 CEO

pay + X Pi Firm and Industry control variables (1)

Model (1) is the main model in this essay. In this model, we can analyze the effects of
TMT total pay and TMT pay dispersion concurrently; we will find whether the effect of
TMT compensation on firm performance is significant with the appearance of CEO
compensation in the equation. A positive and statistically significant coefficient Pi in this
equation supports the tournament effect, while a negative coefficient provides empirical
support for the equity fairness hypothesis. In Model (1), if p2 is positive and significant
then overall executive compensation is effective in the sense that firm performance is
positively related to the compensation all executives receive.

In the next model, I exclude CEO compensation from my equation to investigate the
effect of TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay alone on firm performance:
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Firm performance

=

Po +Pi TMT pay dispersion +P2 TMT total pay + E Pi Firm

and Industry control variables (2)

Model (2) is also a simple way to deal with the potential multicollinearity issue. If
multicollinearity is not a serious problem, the estimates of remaining variables should be
stable in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients in comparison to Model (1).

In the last two models, I study the effect of TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay on
firm performance separately, also controlling for all firm and industry specific variables:

Firm performance — Po +Pi TMT pay dispersion +2* pt Firm and Industry control
variables (3)

Firm performance = Po +P2 TMT total pay + E P, Firm and Industry control
variables (4)

Model (3) provides further empirical evidence for the debate between the tournament
hypothesis and the equity fairness hypothesis. Similar to Model (1), a positive and
significant Pi supports the tournament effect; otherwise, it provides no empirical support
for this tournament hypothesis. A positive and significant P2 in Model (4) shows an
overall effective executive compensation policy in the sense that firm performance relates
positively to the compensation all executives receive.
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2.3 Empirical results

Table 5 shows the empirical results of Model (1), Model (2), Model (3) and Model (4) of
firm performance on executive compensation level:

[Insert table 5 here]

Model (1) includes total compensation and compensation dispersion of TMT as well as
all control variables for CEO compensation effect, firm specific effect and industry
specific effect. The result of this model shows a positive and significant coefficient of the
dispersion of TMT compensation. This provides strong empirical support for the
tournament effect hypothesis. TMT total compensation also displays a positive and
significant relationship to firm performance, showing the effectiveness of the total
compensation for TMT on firm performance. Interestingly, the relationship between
control variable CEO pay and firm performance is statistically significant, but negative;
meaning that CEO compensation is not effective as expected in the sense that an increase
in CEO compensation possibly does not lead to a increase in firm performance.

In Model (2), when excluding the effect of CEO compensation, I also find relationships
between TMT compensation in terms of pay dispersion and total pay and firm
performance very similar to those results found in Model (1). Specifically, the association
between TMT pay dispersion and firm performance as well as the relationship between
TMT total pay and firm performance are positive and significant.
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I also find similar results from Model (3) and Model (4). Model (3) shows a positive and
statistically significant association between TMT pay dispersion and firm performance. It
supports the tournament hypothesis. Model (4) also displays a positive and statistically
significant relationship between TMT total pay and firm performance. This result shows
that TMT total pay may statistically affect firm performance, and then we should
consider this effect of TMT compensation when studying the general executive
compensation - firm performance relationship. We can also say that the compensation the
firms pay for TMT as a whole team is effective in the sense that an increase in TMT total
payment may lead to an increase in firm performance.

Overall, the empirical results show that TMT compensation does influence firm
performance. Especially, the impacts of both TMT compensation dispersion as well as
TMT total compensation on firm performance are positive and statistically significant. It
strongly supports the tournament effect hypothesis and suggests further emphasis on
TMT compensation research. As the results of Model (2), Model (3) and Model (4) are
consistent with the results of Model (1) we find that although the correlation coefficient
between CEO pay and TMT total pay is high, the problem of multicollinearity should not
be serious in this data sample.

2.4 Robustness check

For robustness check purpose, I will use a different measure of firm performance as well
as check for potential econometric issues such as multicollinearity and endogeneity of our
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data sample. I also use different estimation techniques to investigate the relationship
between firm performance and executive compensation. The results are in Table 6.

[Insert table 6 here]

Performance measure

To investigate how sensitive the relationship between TMT compensation and firm
performance is to the measure of firm performance, I use earnings per share (EPS) as an
alternative measure. I do not choose return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE) for
robustness test because of the reasons mentioned when selecting Tobin's Q as the main
performance measure (Barber and Lyon 1996). In Panel A, with a positive and significant
coefficient of TMT pay dispersion, we still have empirical evidence supporting the
tournament effect hypothesis. Even though, the effect of CEO pay is no longer significant
and that of TMT total compensation is negative. It suggests that the studied relationship
is maybe sensitive to the measure of firm performance.

Statistical issues

Test for multicollinearity

I run Model (1) with the options for multicollinearity diagnostics. The result is in Panel
B. According to Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), when the largest condition index is
larger than 100, the coefficient estimates might have a "fair amount" of numerical error
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due to multicollinearity. In our sample, the maximum conditional index is approximately
64, which is much lower than 100, thus I can conclude that multicollinearity does not
cause serious problem with this study.

Endogeneity issue

In the first essay, we have a potential problem of endogeneity because executive
compensation may be determined on the basis of firm

performance, and a good

compensation policy motivates executives to work better in order to increase firm value. I
employ Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation to deal with this potential
endogeneity problem. In the first stage, I run the regressions of main independent
variables, which are CEO compensation, TMT total pay, and TMT pay dispersion, on
firm and industry specific control variables and compute their predicted values. In the
second step, I run the regression of firm performance on predicted values of independent
variables previously computed. The result in Panel C shows that the relationship between
firm performance and TMT compensation, adjusted for endogeneity effect, is statistically
significant. Importantly, the tournament effect hypothesis is strongly supported. We
should notice also that the signs of TMT total compensation and CEO compensation
effects change, meaning that these effect may be sensitive to performance measure.

Generalized linear model

I also use a generalized linear model with maximum likelihood estimation to run the
regression of firm performance on TMT compensation to overcome some limitations of
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the OLS model, and the results in Panel D are consistent with those of Model (1).
Specifically, the association between firm performance and TMT compensation in terms
of pay dispersion and total pay is positive and statistically significant.

Panel regressions

As do most of the articles in the literature, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
for the main analysis. On the one hand, this technique is simple, easy to interpret, and
does not lose any observations in the analysis. On the other hand, OLS regressions ignore
the panel nature of the compensation data: the combination of a cross section of firms and
times series over the period from 1992 to 2010. For this reason, it is important to use
panel regression to study the relationship between executive compensation and firm
performance.

We can categorize panel models according to the structure of error terms such as one-way
or two-way models, fixed-effect and random effect models, autoregressive models, or
moving-average models. For robustness check purposes, in this essay I use five panel
models: one-way fixed-effect, one-way time fixed-effect, two-way fixed effect, one-way
random-effect, and two-way random-effect. I construct the balanced panel data requiring
that the firms have compensation and financial data for all years from 1992 to 2010. The
final data sample includes 2,299 firm-year observations from 121 firms in 37 industries
over the period 1992 to 2010. As we can see, we lose a good number of observations in
our panel data, and it is a disadvantage of panel data models.

30

Panel E presents the results of these panel models: These results are consistent and they
are identical to the results of the OLS models. In all panel regressions, firm performance
is positively and significantly associated with TMT compensation dispersion and TMT
total pay. Firm performance is negatively and significantly related to CEO compensation.
The results show that it is important to investigate the effect of TMT compensation
beyond the CEO pay effect, and provide very strong empirical evidence for the
tournament effect hypothesis.

2.5 Summary

This essay investigates the effect of TMT compensation on firm performance analyzing
both the summation and dispersion of TMT compensation and controlling for the effects
of CEO compensation, firm specific characteristics, and industry specific characteristics.
The research provides some interesting empirical results. On the one hand, TMT
compensation positively and significantly influences firm performance, even after
controlling for the effect of CEO pay. Specifically, this positive, significant and large
impact of TMT pay dispersion on firm performance strongly supports the tournament
effect hypothesis. This effect and the significant and positive relationship between TMT
total pay and firm performance suggest that we should explore further the effect of TMT
compensation on financial

decisions, although this relationship may be sensitive to

performance measure. On the other hand, the effect of CEO pay on firm performance is
negative in several specifications. This may suggest the ineffectiveness of CEO pay in
firm performance.
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In short, this essay suggests that executive compensation research should focus not only
on CEO compensation but also on the compensation of all executives as a team, and,
consistent with the upper echelon perspective, TMT compensation does play an important
role in firm performance.
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3. CFO PAY STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
3.1 Literature review

Executive pay structure

In the first paper we find that the level of executive compensation in terms of TMT
compensation and CEO compensation is significantly associated with firm performance.
While TMT total compensation and pay dispersions are positively related to firm
performance, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is not
positive as expected. In this second essay I will investigate the impact of executive pay
structure on firm performance, focusing on the impact of CFO pay structure.

Murphy (1999) provides a description of executive compensation structure. The main
components of executive pay are base salary, annual bonus plan, and stock options. Other
pay components are restricted stocks, long-term incentive plan, health care plan,
retirement plan, and so on. Typically, the formal employment will specify a minimum
base salary, target bonus payment, terms of stock options and other salary plans.

According this study (Murphy 1999), the base salary is set mainly based on industry
benchmarking. The base salaries for CEOs of similar firms in terms of size within the
same industry tend to be similar to each other. Although base salaries comprise a
decreasing portion of total compensation, executives do pay a lot of attention to these
base salaries because they are the key component of the executive employment contract.
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Murphy finds that the base salary is significantly associated with firm size, and that,
during the 1990s, stock options replace base salaries as the highest portion of total
compensation. As the base salary is a fixed component in the compensation, a higher base
salary would lead to higher values of other components as most of these components may
be measured as a percent of base salary.

CEO and other executives of the firms receive annual bonus plans based on firm
performance in a given year, for this reason the bonus is the first component of executive
compensation with the incentives to increase firm performance. Annual bonus plans can
be characterized by performance measures, performance standards, and the relationship
between performance and pay. Typically, the firms pay no bonus until an achievement of
threshold performance, pay a minimum bonus at the threshold performance, and bonus
payments have a cap or upper limit. Although annual bonus plans provide incentives to
increase stockholders' wealth in terms of firm profitability as executives will only receive
bonus payments if the firm achieves some threshold limits in performance, bonus plans
also create incentive effects of firm performance measures in terms of manipulation of
accounting profits, incentive effects of performance standards, and incentive effects of
pay-performance structure (Murphy 1999).

Stock options give the executives the right to buy stocks at a predetermined price for a
pre-specified time, sometimes stock options are referred as equity-based compensation.
The incentives of executives here is to buy stocks at low prices and then increase stock
prices. This increase in stock prices also increases the wealth of stockholders. Executive
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stock options are non-tradable and voided if executives leave the company before the
time specified in the employment contract. In practice, most options expire in ten years
and are granted at fair market prices. There is a notable trend in executive compensation
that stock options explode and contribute the single biggest portion of executive pay
(Murphy 1999).

Several studies have investigated the relationship between executive compensation
structure and firm performance. Mehran (1995) analyzes compensation structure and firm
performance together with firm ownership and states that pay structure, especially equitybased compensation, rather than pay level, motivates managers to increase firm value. He
also finds the important impact of ownership in the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance.

Rayton (2003) investigates the relation between firm performance and compensation
structure of average employees in terms of performance elasticity and suggests a link
between average employee compensation

structure

and

performance

in

manufacturing industries. This link is stronger for high performance firms

US
and

indistinguishable from zero for low performance.

Blackwell, Dudney and Farrell (2007) analyze the changes in CEO compensation
structure and its influence on firm performance after CEO turnover. They find that the
incoming CEOs do change their compensation structure in comparison to that of outgoing
CEOs with more stock options and new stock grants. They also document a significant

35

association between CEO pay structure change in terms of new stock grants and firm
performance after CEO turnover.

The literature of CFO compensation is much more limited in comparison to that of CEO
compensation. Among these few researchers, some find

an increasing association

between CFO compensation and the organizational performance of hospitals in the US
(Early and Cleverly 1995), others find a mixed association between CFO compensation
and firm performance in banking industry (Bisson 2009). Bisson also concludes that there
is a little connection between executive compensation structure and firm performance.

CEO versus CFO in corporate finance

In other fields of corporate finance, some researchers explore the role of CFO and
compare it with the role of CEO in financial decisions of the firms. Some researchers
(Jiang, Petroni and Yanyan 2010) investigate the influences of CEOs and CFOs on
earnings manipulation. They document that, although both CEOs and CFOs influence
accruals management, the impact of CFOs is stronger because CFOs are mainly
responsible for financial reporting. They find that the probability and magnitude of
beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to the equity incentives of CFO than those of
CEO, this finding provides support for SEC requirement of CFO disclosures in 2006.

In another article (Feng, Ge, Luo and Shevlin 2011), Feng and colleagues try to explain
the reasons why CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations. They find that
CFOs of manipulation firms and CFOs of non-manipulation firms have similar equity
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incentives, while CEOs of manipulating firms have more power than CEOs of nonmanipulating counterparts. They propose that CFOs become involved in accounting
management not because of their own immediate financial benefits but because of the
pressure from their CEOs.

Other researchers (Chava and Pumanandam 2010) also analyze the difference between
CEOs and CFOs in terms of incentives and corporate policies. They investigate risktaking incentives on corporate financial policies and find that both CEO incentives and
CFO incentives have a significant impact on the financial policies of the firms. They also
find a causal link between executive compensation incentives and corporate policies, and
suggest that both CEO and CFO incentives are important in designing optimal
compensation for the firms.

The literature investigates possible links between executive compensation and the current
financial crisis. Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) provide a case study about the
executive compensation issues of failed firms such as Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers.
They find

that the top executive managers of these firms

received very large

performance-based compensation during the period 2000-2008, just before the financial
crisis, and that some pay arrangements provide executives with excessive risk-taking
incentives, which possibly help to cause the financial crisis in 2007-2008.

37

Gaps in the literature

Although CFOs are playing an increasingly important role in corporate finance, most
research papers studying the impact of executive compensation on firm performance
focus only on the CEO compensation structure, and the number of studies of CFO pay
structure on firm performance is very limited. This essay will cover this gap by analyzing
the effect of the CFO compensation structure on firm performance, and contribute to the
literature by providing empirical evidence for the importance of CFO compensation on
corporate finance decisions.

Research question and hypotheses

This second essay investigates how CFO compensation structure relates to firm
performance, and whether this impact, if any, is significant after controlling for the
impact of CEO pay structure. Investigating the main question about the association
between CFO compensation structure and firm performance, this essay hypothesizes that
CFO compensation structure in terms of bonus and stock options does significantly relate
to firm performance, and that this relationship is still significant even after controlling for
the effect of CEO compensation structure.

This hypothesis, is supported, suggests that CFOs play an increasingly important role in
corporate financial decision-making; as a consequence, those responsible for executive
compensation structure policy should not only focus on the CEO pay structure but also
pay more attention to the effect of the CFO pay structure on firm performance.
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3.2 Data and methodology

Data

I collect the executive compensation data from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp
database, which includes more than 1500 S&P firms each year from 1992 to 2010,
including S&P 500, Midcap and Smallcap index firms. This list of companies changes
from year to year because companies leave the S&P classified list of firms and other
companies enter the list according to the selection criteria from Standard and Poor's
company.

While the compensation data of executives and particularly that of CEOs are available in
general for long periods from 1992 to the present, the data for CFO compensation has
been available only since 2006 as required by SEC. For each firm-year unit in my sample
I collect the data of both CEO compensation and CFO compensation and then merge
them into a dataset for further analysis.

Similar to the first essay, the second essay also uses basic accrual and financial data such
as total assets, common equity, total debt, market value, free cash flows, sales growth,
and so forth from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database.
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Variables

The dependent variable:

I use Tobin's Q as the measure of firm performance for the main analysis.

Independent variables:

The main independent variables are CFO pay structure variables measured by CFO bonus
portion and CFO stock options portion. As their names indicate, the CFO bonus portion is
the percentage of bonus on CFO total compensation and the percentage of stock options
on CFO total compensation respectively.

I plot the CFO pay and CEO pay over years and over industries in Figure 4 as well as the
CFO options and CEO option in Figure 5:

[Insert figure 4 here]

[Insert figure 5 here]

Figure 4 shows the relationship between CFO pay and CEO pay, and we can observe a
close relationship between these compensations over years as well as over industries.
More importantly, Figure 5 presents a positive correlation between CFO pay structure
and CEO pay structure in terms of options. It is a signal of collinearity and I will deal
with this issue in more detail in the methodology and robustness check sections.
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Control variables:

In this essay, I use variables related to CEO compensation structure such as CEO bonus
portion and CEO stock options portion to control for the effects of CEO pay on firm
performance, which are more widely investigated in the literature and found related to
firm performance.

Similar to the first essay, the second essay also uses firm specific control variables such
as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, and sales growth. Some
variables are measured in logarithm and others are standardized to reduce the potential
problem of nonstationarity. I also apply the process of winsorizing for many financial
data variables to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers by excluding observations
with the values of variables such as Tobin's Q, firm size, leverage, free cash flows, sales
growth, and book to market are above the top or below the bottom 1 percentile of the
sample data. Industry specific control variable is the performance mean of all firms in the
same 2-digit SIC industry.

Table 7 presents the definitions and measures of all variables used in the second essay:

[Insert table 7 here]
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Descriptive statistics

Summary statistics

After computing CEO compensation structure variables, CFO compensation structure
variables, and other firm/industry specific control variables, I merge all the variables into
a data sample for main analysis. This data sample includes 7,414 firm-year observations
from 1,898 firms in 65 industries over the period from 2006 to 2010.

Table 8 represents the summary statistics of dependent variable, firm performance;
independent variables such as CEO bonus portion, CEO options portion, CFO bonus
portion, and CFO options portion; as well as firm specific and industry specific control
variables such as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, sales growth,
and industry performance.

[Insert table 8 here]

Correlation coefficients

Table 9 shows displays the Pearson correlation coefficients among firm performance,
CFO pay structure, and control variables in this essay:

[Insert table 9 here]
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Unlike in the first essay, in the second essay I do not find any pair of variables with
extremely high correlation coefficients, and I keep all the variables and do not exclude
any variable from my analysis.

Methodology

I run the regression of firm performance on CFO pay structure variables, CFO bonus and
CFO options, controlling by effects of CEO pay structure as well as firm and industry
specific characteristics:

Firm performance = Po + Pi CFO Bonus Portion + ft2 CFO Stock Options Portion
+P3 CEO Bonus Portion + ft4 CEO Stock Options Portion + 27 /?, Control
variables (5)

Model (5) is the main model of this essay. In this model, we can interpret the sign and
significance of coefficients Pi and P2 to investigate the effect of CFO compensation
structure on firm performance after controlling for all CEO pay structure as well as firm
and industry-specific characteristics. We can also compare the effect of CFO pay on firm
performance to that of CEO compensation structure by comparing the magnitude and
significance of Pi and P2 to those of p3 and p4 if they are significant.

I exclude CEO structure from Model (6) and run the regression of firm performance on
CFO pay structure only to study its effect on firm performance:
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Firm performance = Po + Pi CFO Bonus Portion + P2 CFO Stock Options Portion
+ £ Pi Control variables (6)

In this model, if pi and/or /?? are significant, this is the first evidence that the
compensation structure of the CFO does influence firm performance, or CFO pay
structure and firm performance are statistically significantly related.

Finally, I run the regression of firm performance on CEO pay structures to investigate
whether it independently affects firm performance:

Firm performance = Po + P3 CEO Bonus Portion + @4 CEO Stock Options Portion
+ Z ^ Control variables (7)

Similarly, in Model (7), the significance of the coefficients p3 and/or P4 will confirm that
firm performance and CEO pay structure are statistically and significantly associated
with each other after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Model (6) and
Model (7) also provides a simple way to deal with multicollinearity issue:
Multicollinearity is not a serious issue if the beta coefficients do not change much in
comparison to those in Model (5) in terms of sign and significance.

3.3 Empirical results

Table 10 presents the empirical results of this second essay:

[Insert table 10 here]
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Model (5) confirms that pay structure of CFO and CEO are significantly associated with
firm performance. The CFO stock options portion and CEO stock options portion
positively relate to the performance of their firms. More importantly, we can observe that
in this model the impact of CFO pay structure on firm performance is positive and very
significant even after controlling for CEO pay structure as well as other firm and industry
specific characteristics.

Even more, we can observe that at first glance CFO options portion's impact is stronger
than the impact of CEO options portion on firm performance in both magnitude in terms
of coefficient values and significance in terms of t-value. I use the method of Gujarati
(2004) to statistically compare these coefficients as following. First, I run Model (5) with
appropriate options to obtain coefficient estimates of CFO options portion and CEO
options portion as well as the variance - covariance matrix of these estimates, this matrix
is in Panel B of Table 10. Second, I compute t-statistics according to the formula:

PcFO options~HCEO options
Jvar(/?CF0 options) + var{pCE0 options)

2cov(/?cfo Options, PcEO options)

From Panel A and Panel B of Table 5,1 compute t = 1.89, and this statistic supports the
alternative hypothesis that

($CF0 options > PCEO options with a 5% confidence level. In

other words, I find that the effect of the CFO option portion on firm performance is
stronger than that of the CEO option portion on firm performance.
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Model (6) demonstrates that CFO pay structure, in terms of CFO stock options portion in
the total compensation package is positively associated with firm performance. The
association between CFO bonus portion and firm performance is negative but not
significant. The results show the empirical evidence that CFO compensation structure
does influence significantly firm performance, and suggest that CFO compensation is
playing an important role in firm performance

Model (7) finds a similar relationship between CEO compensation structure and firm
performance. Specifically, the CEO stock options portion positively affects firm
performance in the sense that some of the coefficients of CEO pay structure variables are
statistically significant. Regarding CEO bonus portion, its relationship to firm
performance is also negative but not significant. These results are consistent with the
literature documenting that the effect of stock options on firm performance becomes
increasingly stronger and that of bonus becomes weaker over time (Murphy 1999).

The effects of firm specific and industry specific control variables in Model (5) are very
similar in Model (6) and Model (7). Firm size, firm leverage, and book to market ratio are
negatively and significantly related to firm performance, and industry performance is
positively and significantly associated with firm performance. We can also observe some
interesting patterns from the effects of control variables in Model (6) and Model (7). For
example, firm

size, firm leverage, and book to market ratio are negatively and

significantly associated with firm

performance, while free

cash flows and average

performance of the industry are positively and significantly associated with firm

46

performance as expected. The association between sales growth and firm performance is
positive but also small in magnitude.

Overall, the empirical results show that CFO pay structure significantly relates to firm
performance. The CFO compensation's stock options portion statistically and
significantly associate with firm performance, although the bonus portion does not. This
impact is even stronger when controlling for the possible effects of CEO compensation.
This empirical evidence may further explain the reason why the SEC requires firms to
disclose executive compensation structure from 2002 and specially focuses on CFO
compensation from 2006.

3.4 Robustness check

Similar to the first essay, in this section I also use different measure of firm performance,
check for potential econometric issue of multicollinearity, and employ different
techniques such as maximum likelihood estimation and panel regression to investigate
the relationship between firm performance and CFO compensation structure. Table 11
presents all the results of these robustness checks.

[Insert table 11 here]

Performance measure
When I use earnings per share (EPS) as a firm performance measure to investigate
relationship of executive compensation on firm performance measure, I find a positive
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and significant relationship between CFO options and firm performance, which is
consistent with Model (5). The CEO options portion also positively relates to firm
performance, although the significance level of this relationship is lower. We can observe
also that the CFO bonus portion and the CEO bonus portion seem to have insignificant
association with firm performance.

Statistical issues

Test for multicollinearity

Panel B shows the multicollinearity diagnostics for Model (5). I conclude that
multicollinearity is not a serious problem in this essay because the maximum condition
index is approximately 27. In more details, Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that
a condition index higher than 100 will cause serious errors due to collinearity.

Generalized linear model

Panel C presents the regression results when using a generalized linear model with
maximum likelihood estimation, and these results are very consistent with those
previously obtained from Model (5).

Panel regressions

The second essay also uses panel models for robustness check purpose to explore
accurately the panel nature of compensation and financial data as the combination of
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cross sectional and times series data. Five panel models used are one-way fixed-effect,
one-way time fixed-effect, two way fixed effect, one-way random-effect, and two-way
random-effect.

I construct the balanced panel data merging CFO compensation structure, CEO
compensation structure and firm financial data. The final panel data contains 3,975 firmyear observations from 795 firms in 63 industries over the period from 2006 to 2010.1
run Model (5) using five different specifications. The results are in Panel D.

Overall, the results are identical to those from Model (5). In details, the relationship
between CFO pay structure in terms of stock options portion and firm performance is
positive and statistically significant. This impact is still significant when we control for
CEO compensation effect.

3.5 Summary

Following the still young literature studying the impact of CFO's on corporate finance
decisions, the second essay investigates the impact of CFO compensation structure on
firm performance, and achieves some important research results and may provide useful
suggestions in practice.

The essay proposes and demonstrates empirically that the CFO compensation structure,
in terms of the portion of stock options in the total compensation, influences positively
and significantly firm performance, even after controlling for the impact of the CEO
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compensation structure and other effects. The essay also confirms the results in the
literature that the CEO pay structure, especially the CEO stock options portion does
influence positively firm performance. More importantly, the second essay shows that the
impact of CFO compensation structure on firm performance is stronger than that of CEO
compensation structure in terms of both value and t-statistic of their coefficients in the
corresponding regressions. This result is still strongly robust for different measures of
firm performance and regression models.

This essay suggests that researchers and policy makers on executive compensation
structure should not focus only on CEO compensation structure but also pay more
attention to CFO compensation structure when analyzing the executive pay structure
effect on firm performance. More generally, CFOs should receive more attention in the
investigation of corporate finance because CFOs are playing an increasingly important
role in corporate financial management.
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4. CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates the relationship between executive compensation and firm
performance analyzing both level and structure of executive compensation. I do not only
focus on the effect of CEO compensation but also explore the effect of compensation on
all top executives of the firm as a team, as well as the effect of CFO compensation
because of their increasing importance in firm business decision making.

The first essay investigates executive pay level, focusing on the effect of TMT
compensation on firm performance and finds that TMT compensation in terms of the
compensation dispersion among executives of Top Management Team does influence
firm performance significantly and positively. The results strongly support the
tournament effect hypothesis. The first essay also shows that the effect of TMT total
compensation on firm performance is also positive and statistically significant, although
it may be sensitive to performance measure. Interestingly, the effect of CEO
compensation on firm performance is statistically significant but negative, indicating that
CEO pay is probably not effective.

The second essay analyzes executive pay structure exploring the influence of CFO pay
structure on firm performance. On the one hand, this essay finds the empirical support for
the literature stating that CEO pay structure in terms of CEO stock options portion has a
significant and positive effect on firm performance. On the other hand, the essay shows
that CFO compensation structure also positively and significantly relates to firm
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performance after controlling the impact of CEO pay structure and other firm and
industry characteristics. This effect of CFO pay structure is even stronger than that of
CEO compensation structure.

This dissertation suggests that future research on executive compensation should focus
not only on CEO compensation but also on compensation of top executives as a team
TMT, as well as CFO compensation. Analyzing all these features will provide us a more
comprehensive and complete picture of executive compensation and executive pay effect
on firm performance. It is important not only in academic research but also in the
practical financial decisions of the firms.

52

REFERENCES
Aggarwal, R. K., and A. A. Samwick, 1999. Executive Compensation, Strategic
Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence, The
Journal of Finance 54, 1999-2043.
Akerlof, G. A., and J. L. Yellen, 1988. Fairness and Unemployment, American Economic
Review 78, 44.
Auden, W. C., J. D. Shackman, and M. H. Onken, 2006. Top management team,
international risk management factor and firm performance, Team Performance
Management 12,209-224.
Barber, B. M., and J. D. Lyon, 1996. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The
empirical power and specification of test statistics, Journal of Financial
Economics 41, 359-399.
Bebchuk, L. A., A. Cohen, and H. Spamann, 2010. The Wages of Failure: Executive
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, Yale Journal on
Regulation, Vol. 27, 2010, pp. 257-282.
Belsley, D. A., E. Kuh, and R. E. Welsch, 1980. Regression Diagnostics^ohn Wiley &
Sons, New York).
Bisson, D., 2009. Bank CFO Pay and Performance: Mixed Relationship, Financial
Executive 25, 10-10.
Blackwell, D., D. Dudney, and K. Farrell, 2007. Changes in CEO compensation structure
and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 29, 315-338.
Burns, N., and S. Kedia, 2008. Executive option exercises and financial misreporting,
Journal of Banking &amp; Finance 32, 845-857.
Cannella Jr, A. A., J.-H. Park, and H.-U. Lee, 2008. Top management team functional
background diversity and firm performance: Examining the roles of team member
colocation and environmental uncertainty, Academy of Management Journal 51,
768-784.

53

Carmeli, A., and A. Tishler, 2006. The relative importance of the top management team's
managerial skills, International Journal of Manpower 27,9-36.
Carpenter, M. A., and W. G. Sanders, 2004. The Effects of Top Management Team Pay
and Firm Internationalization on MNC Performance, Journal of Management 30,
509-528.
Carpenter, M. A., and W. M. G. Sanders, 2002. Top management team compensation: the
missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?, Strategic Management
Journal 23, 367-375.
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam, 2010. CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate
policies, Journal of Financial Economics 97, 263-278.
Ciscel, D. H., and T. M. Carroll, 1980. The determinants of executive salaries: An
econometric survey, Review of Economics & Statistics 62, 7.
Conyon, M. J., 1997. Corporate governance and executive compensation, International
Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 493-509.
Cosh, A., and A. Hughes, 1997. Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and
institutional shareholdings, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15,
469-492.
Coughlan, A. T., and R. M. Schmidt, 1985. Executive compensation, management
turnover, and firm performance : An empirical investigation, Journal of
Accounting and Economics 7,43-66.
Drago, R., and G. T. Garvey, 1998. Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and
Evidence, Journal of Labor Economics 16,1.
Early, L. A., and W. O. Cleverly, 1995. CFO compensation increasingly linked to
performance, hfm (Healthcare Financial Management) 49,44.
Edmans, A., and X. Gabaix, 2009. Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New
Optimal Contracting Theories, European Financial Management 15,486-496.
Eisenhardt, K. M., and C. B. Schoonhoven, 1990. Organizational Growth: Linking
Founding Team, Strategy, Environment, and Growth among U.S. Semiconductor
Ventures, 1978-1988, Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 504-529.

54

Feng, M., W. Ge, S. Luo, and T. Shevlin, 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in
material accounting manipulations?, Journal of Accounting and Economics 51,
21-36.
Firth, M., P. M. Y. Fung, and O. M. Rui, 2006. Corporate performance and CEO
compensation in China, Journal of Corporate Finance 12,693-714.
Fuller, J., and M. C. Jensen, 2002. Just say no to wall street: Putting a stop to the earnings
game, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14,41-46.
Groves, T., H. Yongmiao, J. McMillan, and B. Naughton, 1995. China's evolving
managerial labor market, Journal of Political Economy 103, 873.
Gujarati, D. N., 2004. Basic Econometrics, Chapter 8, 4th edition.
Hambrick, D. C., and J. A. A. Cannella, 1993. Relative standing: A framework for
understanding departures of acquired executives, Academy of Management
Journal 36, 733-762.
Hambrick, D. C., and R. A. D'Aveni, 1992. Top team deterioration as part of the
downward spiral of large corporate bankruptcies, Management Science 38, 14451466.
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason, 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a
Reflection of Its Top Managers, Academy of Management Review 9, 193-206.
Harris, J., 2009. What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?, Journal of Business
Ethics 85,147-156.
Hubbard, R. G., and D. Palia, 1995. Executive pay and performance Evidence from the
U.S. banking industry, Journal of Financial Economics 39, 105-130.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305360.
Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy, 1990. Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98,225-264.

55

Jiang, J., K. R. Petroni, and I. Yanyan, 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most
influence on earnings management?, Journal of Financial Economics 96, 513526.
Kale, J. R., E. Reis, and A. Venkateswaran, 2009. Rank-Order Tournaments and
Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance, The Journal of Finance
64, 1479-1512.
Kaplan, S. N., 1994. Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany,
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 10,142-159.
Kato, T., 1997. Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New
evidence from micro data, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15,
455-467.
Kato, T., and M. Rockel, 1992. Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the
Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data,
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 6, 30-51.
Koufopoulos, D., V. Zoumbos, M. Argyropoulou, and J. Motwani, 2008. Top
management team and corporate performance: a study of Greek firms, Team
Performance Management 14,340 - 363.
Lee, K., B. Lev, and G. Yeo, 2008. Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and
firm performance, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 30, 315-338.
Leonard, J. S., 1990. Executive pay and firm performance, Industrial & Labor Relations
Review 43,13-S-29-S.
Lewellen, W. G., and B. Huntsman, 1970. Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance,
American Economic Review 60, 710-720.
Mehran, H., 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance,
Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
Milgrom, P. R., 1988. Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient
Organization Design, Journal of Political Economy 96,42.
Murphy, K. J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical
analysis, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7,11 -42.

56

Murphy, K. J., 1999. Chapter 38 Executive compensation (Elsevier).
Norburn, D., and S. Birley, 1988. The top management team and corporate performance,
Strategic Management Journal 9,225-237.
O'Reilly, C. A., B. G. Main, and G. S. Crystal, 1988. CEO Compensation as Tournament
and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories, Administrative Science
Quarterly 33, 257-274.
Olson, B. J., S. Parayitam, and N. W. Twigg, 2006. Mediating Role of Strategic Choice
Between Top Management Team Diversity and Firm Performance: Upper
Echelons Theory Revisited, Journal of Business & Management 12,111-126.
Pfeffer, J., and N. Langton, 1993. The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction,
Productivity, and Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and
University Faculty, Administrative Science Quarterly 38,382-407.
Rayton, B. A., 2003. Firm performance and compensation structure: performance
elasticities of average employee compensation, Journal of Corporate Finance 9,
333.
Roberts, D. R., 1956. A general theory of executive compensation based on statistically
tested propositions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 70,270-294.
Simons, T., L. H. Pelled, and K. A. Smith, 1999. Making use of difference: Diversity,
debate, and decision comprehensiveness in top management teams, Academy of
Management Journal 42, 662-673.
Wei, L.-Q., C.-M. Lau, M. N. Young, and Z. Wang, 2005. The Impact of Top
Management Team Demography on Firm Performance in China, Asian Business
& Management 4,227-250.
West, J. C. T., and C. R. Schwenk, 1996. Top management team strategic consensus,
demographic homogeneity and firm performance: A report of resounding
nonfindings, Strategic Management Journal 17, 571-576.
Zhou, X., 2000. CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada,
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'economique 33, 213-251.

57

Table 1. Brief summary Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database
(Source: CompuStat.com)
ExecuComp includes annual compensation data from 1992 forward of the top executive officers
within a company. In total, this database contains compensation data of more than 32,000 top
executives from over 2,900 companies over the period from 1992 to present. Each year
ExecuComp includes annual compensation data of top executives of about S&P 1500 companies,
from which 600 are small, 400 are mid and 500 large cap firms. Following are the datasets that
are provided. Fields identifying unique records for each table are noted in parenthesis.

N

Description

1

ANNCOMP - (co_per_rol + year). Lists all named executives, titles, and their compensation
data. Compensation data includes salary, stock options, bonuses, and shares owned.

2

BLACKSCHOLESMEANS - (Year) Applies to the 1992 reporting format only. Includes
the highest and lowest volatility and yield figures that were used the Compustat Black
Scholes Model. A descripion of this model is available on the S&P Compustat website at
www.compustatresources.com.

3

CODIRFIN - (gvkey + year).Includes director compensation data for 2005 and prior as well
as company financial data. The director compensation data includes items such as: number
of board meetings, annual options received, annual shares received, and annual retainer. The
company financial data includes various income statement and balance sheet data items in
addition to market value and share price data.

4

COLEV - (gvkey).Contains company level information. The company level information
includes items such as: address, SIC, CUSIP number, ticker, stock exchange, and industiy/
index information.

5

COPEROL - (co_per_rol).Contains items specific to each person working at a given
company. Items such as: most recent title held, when executive became/left CEO, when
executive joined/left company, and reason for leaving company.

6

DEFERREDCOMP - (co_per_rol + year + defer_id).Applies to the current reporting format
only.Includes detailed

information

about

deferred

contribution information and individual plan balances.

compensation

plans

including
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7

DIRECTORCOMP - (gvkey + year + dirnbr).Applies to the current reporting format
only.Includes compensation information by director, including items such as cash fees,
stock awards, and pension compensation.

8

LTAWDTAB - (co_per_rol + year + awdnum).Applies to the 1992 reporting format only.
Contains data pertaining to long term incentive awards. It includes information such as:
shares awarded, value of shares, and payout term.

9

OUTSTANDINGAWARDS - (co_per_rol + year + outawdnum).Applies to the current
reporting format only. Includes detailed information about outstanding option and restricted
stock awards.

10

PENSION - (co_per_rol + year + penid).Applies to the current reporting format
only.Includes detailed information about executive pension plans including the credited
years of service and the plan value.

11

PERSON - (execid).Provides specific executive information. Items such as: first and last
name, age and gender.

12

PLANBASEDAWARDS - (co_per_rol + year + grntnum).Applies to the current reporting
format only.Includes detailed information about option, stock, and long-term incentive
awards made to executives during the year. Data items include the option exercise price, the
grant date fair value of the stock/option award, and the potential cash payout under cashbased incentive plans.

13

STGRTTAB - (co_per_rol + year + grntnum).Applies to the 1992 reporting format
only.Contains data pertaining to stock option grants. It includes information such as: stock
option value, exercise price, market price, and expiration date.

The Securities and Exchange Commission implemented a major overhaul in the requirements for
reporting executive compensation data for companies with fiscal years ending in December 2006
and later. Many items in the database apply to only one of the reporting formats.
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Table 2. Variable definitions, TMT pay level and firm performance
(Source: ExecuComp)
This table presents the definitions of all variables used in the first essay such as firm performance,
executive pay, TMT pay dispersion and mean, TMT total pay, CEO pay and other control
variables such as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, sake growth and
industry performance.

The data is selected from ExecuComp database with all not null data items in a single
observation, moreover, total assets, market value, common equity must be positive.

Variables

Description

Firm performance

Tobin's Q

TMT pay dispersion

The ratio of the standard deviation divided by the mean of executive pay
of all TMT members

TMT total pay

The logarithm of summation of executive pay of all TMT members

TMT mean pay

The logarithm of mean of executive pay of all TMT members

CEO pay

The logarithm of CEO's total compensation

Firm size

The logarithm of total assets

Firm leverage

1 - (common equity / total assets)

Book to market ratio

(common equity / market value)

Free cash flows

Operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets of
the firm

Sales growth

Percent sale change in 1 year

Industry performance

The mean of Tobin's Q of all companies in the same 2-digit-SIC
industry
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, TMT pay level and firm performance
This table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables used
in the regression of firm performance on TMT compensation. The definitions and measures of
these variables are in table 2.

Variables

N

Mean

StdDev

Sum

Minimum

Maximum

Firm performance

(1)

26951

1.8490

1.1124

49834

0.7448

9.0273

TMT pay dispersion

(2)

26951

0.7138

0.3453

19240

0.0004

3.4105

TMT total pay

(3)

26951

8.8074

0.9992

237369

4.7770

14.2838

TMT mean pay

(4)

26951

7.0459

0.9931

189896

3.3907

12.6743

CEO pay

(5)

26951

7.6105

1.2422

205111

-6.9077

14.2791

Firm size

(6)

26951

7.4875

1.6316

201797

2.5745

11.9901

Firm leverage

(7)

26951

0.5568

0.2164

15006

0.0776

1.0000

Book to market

(8)

26951

0.5183

0.3258

13971

0

2.3974

Free cash flows

(9)

26951

0.1309

0.0888

3529

-0.4072

0.4333

Sales growth

(10)

26951

12.6771

25.3205

341661

-50.3000

219.6130

Industry performance

(11)

26951

1.8598

0.5422

50125

0.9016

5.4509
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients, TMT pay level and firm performance
This table presents the correlation coefficients among variables in the first essay about the relationship between TMT compensation and
firm performance. The variable definitions and measures are in table 2.
Var

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

Firm performance

(1)

1.0000

TMT pay dispersion

(2)

0.1738

1.0000

TMT total pay

(3)

0.1818

0.4915

1.0000

TMT mean pay

(4)

0.1893

0.4595

0.9777

1.0000

CEO pay

(5)

0.0912

0.4753

0.8299

0.8397

1.0000

Firm size

(6)

-0.2272

0.1221

0.5967

0.5744

0.4974

1.0000

Firm leverage

(7)

-0.3940 -0.0227

0.1343

0.1118

0.1460

0.5456

1.0000

Book to market

(8)

-0.6096 -0.1568 -0.2427 -0.2447 -0.1781

0.0328

0.0804

Free cash flows

(9)

0.4649

0.1058

0.1565

0.1622

0.1330 -0.1376 -0.3157 -0.3946 1.0000

Sales growth

(10)

0.2444

0.0951

0.0794

0.0877

0.0446 -0.0776 -0.0897 -0.1958 0.1346 1.0000

Industry performance

(11)

0.4725

0.0754

0.0178

0.0087 -0.0268 -0.3378 -0.4005 -0.3461 0.2403 0.1240

1.0000

(11)
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Table 5. Pooled regression of Arm performance on TMT compensation level
This table shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on TMT compensation.
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables
are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay. Control variables are CEO pay and other
firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and measures are in table 2.
Models:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Variables

Coef.

t-Stat

Coef.

t-Stat

Coef.

t-Stat

Coef.

t-Stat

Intercept

1.4260

26.41

1.5525

28.66

2.2129

55.97

1.4963

28.75

TMT pay dispersion

0.1001

6.46

0.0666

3.95

0.2042

15.15

TMT total pay

0.2298

23.92

0.1309

18.11

0.1463

23.26

CEO pay

-0.1001 -15.55

Firm size

-0.0661 -14.62 -0.0642 -13.78 -0.0091

Firm leverage

-1.0047 -37.00 -1.0308 -38.35 -1.1255 -41.88 -1.0261 -37.71

Book to market

-1.4469 -89.35 -1.4552 -88.57 -1.5039 -93.26 -1.4552 -89.49

-2.70 -0.0685 -15.47

Free cash flows

1.8793

32.31

1.8380

31.36

1.9687

33.80

1.8310

31.38

Sales growth

0.0035

19.54

0.0036

19.99

0.0038

20.99

0.0036

20.16

Industry performance

0.3229

32.71

0.3312

33.25

0.3534

35.75

0.3303

33.35

Adjusted R-Square

0.5559

0.5520

0.5466

0.5517
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Table 6. Robustness check
Panel A: Use of EPS as a measure of firm performance in Model (1)
This panel shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on TMT compensation.
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Earnings per Share (EPS). Main
independent variables are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay. Control variables are CEO pay
and other firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and measures are in table 2.

Variable

Coefficient

t Value

Dependent variable: Firm performance (EPS)
12.1558

7.38

1.1372

2.19

-3.4619

-10.79

CEO pay

0.3381

1.58

Firm size

2.5873

17.21

Firm leverage

-8.0083

-8.92

Book to market

-2.4703

-4.72

Free cash flows

7.6559

3.90

Sales growth

0.0196

3.18

Industry performance

1.1158

65.32

Adjusted R-Square

0.1500

Intercept
TMT pay dispersion
TMT total pay
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued)

Panel B: Multicollinearity diagnostics
This table shows the collinearity diagnostics among regressors of Model (1) using tol, vif and
collin options.
Collinearity Diagnostics
Proportion of Variation
Condition
Index

Tmt
Intercept

Log

PayDispersion TmtTotalPay

Log

#

Eigenvalue

CEOPay ...

1

8.235700

1.000000

0.000099

0.001670

0.000040 0.000117

2

0.817470

3.174060

0.000028

0.000001

0.000007 0.000023

3

0.412150

4.470140

0.000003

0.004580

0.000004 0.000018

4

0.207900

6.293900

0.000026

0.124350

0.000068 0.000408

5

0.155750

7.271630

0.000241

0.470970

0.000021 0.000004

6

0.107000

8.773220

0.002170

0.104070

0.000251 0.000197

7

0.040670

14.230260

0.000856

0.112950

0.006200 0.030090

8

0.013190

24.986540

0.070080

0.069080

0.008360 0.137520

9

0.008160

31.766740

0.468700

0.057420

0.003310 0.366810

10

0.002010 64.084040

0.457800

0.054910

0.981740 0.464810
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued)

Panel C: 2SLS results
This panel shows the results of 2SLS regression to solve for endogeneity problem. In the first
stage, I run the regressions of main independent variables on controlling variables and compute
the predicted values of these independent variables. In the second stage, I run the regression of
dependent variable on these predicted values. The main dependent variable is firm performance,
measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay.
Control variables are CEO pay and other firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and
measures are in table 2.
Models:

(1-2)
Coef.

Dependent variable
Intercept

(1.3)
t-Stat

IV1
0.4304

Coef.

t-Stat

IV2
24.52

(1.5)

(1.4)
Coef.

t-Stat

IV3

5.4975 146.95

4.3162

Coef.

t-Stat

Q
79.57

3.6438

27.70

TMT pay disp. (IV1)

18.7893 126.24

TMT total pay (IV2)

-1.9068

-20.18

0.2099

2.48

CEO pay (IV3)
Firm size

0.0422

28.11

0.4650 145.18

0.4544

97.85

Firm leverage

-0.1281 -10.64 -0.8584

-33.46 -0.6313 -16.97

Book to market

-0.1147 -15.92 -0.4931

-32.12 -0.4436 -19.93

Free cash flows

0.1670

6.39

1.1738

21.08

1.6290

20.18

Sales growth

0.0009

11.44

0.0024

14.05

0.0017

6.82

Industry performance

0.0343

7.75

0.2055

21.76

0.1321

9.65

Adjusted R-Square

0.0585

0.4913

0.3139

0.4887
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued)

Panel D: GLM using MLE
This panel shows the results of generalized linear model of TMT compensation on firm
performance using maximum likelihood technique. The dependent variable is firm performance,
measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay.
Control variables are CEO pay and other firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and
measures are in table 2.

Variable

(1.6)

Coefficient

p Value

Dependent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q)
Intercept

1.4260

<.0001

TMT pay dispersion

0.1002

<.0001

TMT total pay

0.2299

<.0001

CEO pay

-0.1001

<.0001

Firm size

-0.0662

<.0001

Firm leverage

-1.0048

<.0001

Book to market

-1.4469

<.0001

Free cash flows

1.8793

<.0001

Sales growth

0.0036

<.0001

Industry performance

0.3230

<.0001
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued)

Panel E: panel regressions
This table presents the results of panel regressions of firm performance on TMT compensation. The models are one-way fixed-effect (1.7),
one-way time fixed-effect (1.8), two way fixed effect (1.9), one-way random-effect (1.10) and two-way random-effect (1.11). Dependent
variable, independent variables, and variable definitions and measures are in table 2.

Variable

Fix one (1.7)
Coef.

t Value

Fix one time (1.8)
Coef.

Fix two (1.9)

Ran one (1.10)

Rantwo(l.ll)

t Value

Coef.

t Value

Coef.

t Value

Coef.

t Value

Independent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q)
Intercept

0.8249

2.81

0.4084

1.92

1.5950

3.98

0.8265

3.66

0.7754

2.96

TMT pay dispersion

0.1615

3.85

0.1595

3.47

0.1175

2.75

0.1971

4.75

0.1335

3.18

TMT total pay

0.1933

7.78

0.1042

4.16

0.1632

6.14

0.1440

6.14

0.1523

6.04

CEO pay

-0.0395

-3.37

-0.0446

-4.15

-0.0306

-2.63

-0.0401

-3.52

-0.0297

-2.63

Firm size

-0.1858

-6.54

0.0485

3.48

-0.2363

-6.99

-0.0744

-3.31

-0.0669

-2.92

Firm leverage

-1.0394

-7.80

-1.0140

-10.85

-1.2461

-9.29

-0.9403

-7.71

-1.0634

-8.72

Book to market

-0.9888

-14.59

-1.2985

-19.64

-1.0039

-14.49

-1.0593

-16.01

-1.0577

-15.76

Free cash flows

4.6786

16.06

5.2164

20.12

4.7198

16.01

4.8839

17.51

4.9378

17.52

Sales growth

-0.0001

-0.09

0.0011

1.44

0.0009

1.27

0.0001

0.08

0.0004

0.62

Industry performance

0.5163

12.69

0.2876

9.84

0.5259

10.99

0.4666

12.54

0.4294

10.60

R-Square

0.7748

0.6606

0.7862

0.5022

0.4855
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Table 7. Variable definitions, CFO pay structure and firm performance
Data source: ExecuComp
This table shows the definitions and measures of all variables used in the second essay.
The data is selected from ExecuComp database with all not null data items in a single
observation, moreover, total assets, market value, common equity must be positive.
Variables

Description

Firm performance

Tobin's Q

CFO Bonus Portion

The ratio of CFO bonus divided by CEO total pay

CFO Options Portion

The ratio of CFO stock options divided by CEO total pay

CEO Bonus Portion

The ratio of CEO bonus divided by CEO total pay

CEO Options Portion

The ratio of CEO stock options divided by CEO total pay

Firm size

The log of total assets

Firm leverage

1 - (common equity / total assets)

Book to market ratio

(common equity / market value)

Free cash flows

Operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets of
the firm

Sales growth

Percent sale change in 1 year

Industry performance The mean of Tobin's Q of all companies in the same 2-digit-SIC
industry
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics, CFO pay structure and firm performance
This table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables used
in the regression of firm performance on CFO pay structure. The definitions and measures of
these variables are in table 7.
Variables

N

Mean

Std Dev

Sum

Minimum

Maximum

Firm performance

7414

1.7237

0.9383

12780

0.7456

8.7940

CFO Bonus Portion

7414

0.0531

0.1190

394.3042

0

0.9727

CFO Options Portion

7409

0.1145

0.2209

848.3897

0

1.0000

CEO Bonus Portion

7414

0.0451

0.1219

334.4017

0

1.0000

CEO Options Portion

7405

0.1615

0.2649

1196

0

1.0000

Firm size

7414

7.7466

1.6251

57434

2.5745

11.9901

Firm leverage

7414

0.5469

0.2198

4055

0.0776

0.9997

Book to market ratio

7414

0.5707

0.3579

4232

0.0007

2.3527

Free cash flows

7414

0.1241

0.0892

920.3868

-0.4072

0.4330

Sales growth

7414

8.3038

21.9818

61565

-50.1150

213.3100

Industry performance

7414

1.7264

0.4298

12800

0.9547

3.6880
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Table 9. Pearson correlation coefficients, CFO pay structure and firm performance
This table presents the correlation coefficients among variables in the second essay about the relationship between CFO compensation
structure and firm performance. The variable definitions and measures are in table 7.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

TobinQ

(1)

1.00

CFOBonus

(2)

-0.06

1.00

CFOOptions

(3)

0.29

-0.11

1.00

CEOBonus

(4)

-0.04

0.66

-0.02

1.00

CEOOptions

(5)

0.28

-0.05

0.42

-0.12

1.00

LogFirmSize

(6)

-0.23

0.01

-0.02

-0.03

0.04

1.00

Leverage

(7)

-0.33

0.00

-0.13

-0.01

-0.10

0.51

1.00

BTM

(8)

-0.64

0.07

-0.23

0.03

-0.24

0.08

0.07

1.00

FCF

(9)

0.50

-0.04

0.18

-0.01

0.20

-0.08

-0.29

-0.43

1.00

SaleGrowth

(10)

0.24

0.03

0.18

0.07

0.16

-0.05

-0.12

-0.19

0.20

1.00

IndTobinQ

(11)

0.45

-0.02

0.12

0.00

0.10

-0.32

-0.38

-0.39

0.25

0.16

(11)

1.00
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Table 10. Regression of firm performance on CFO compensation structure
Panel A: OLS results
This table shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on CFO compensation
structure. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent
variables are CFO Bonus Portion and CFO Options Portion. Control variables are CFO Base
Salary, CEO Bonus Portion, CEO Options Portion, and other firm/industry specific variables.
Variable definitions and measures are in table 7.

Variable

(5)
Coef.

(6)
t Value

Coef.

(7)
t Value

Coef.

t Value

2.1849

33.44

Dependent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q)
Intercept

2.1478

33.00

2.1620

33.12

CFO Bonus Portion

0.0754

0.93

-0.0383

-0.63

CFO Options Portion

0.3392

9.35

0.4373

12.98

CEO Bonus Portion

-0.1688

-2.13

-0.1082

-1.82

CEO Options Portion

0.2340

7.66

0.3410

12.01

Firm size

-0.0430

-8.29

-0.0387

-7.45

-0.0420

-8.06

Firm leverage

-0.5332

-12.97

-0.5570

-13.52

-0.5584

-13.54

Book to market ratio

-1.1537

-47.28

-1.1761

-48.31

-1.1770

-48.28

Free cash flows

2.1113

22.57

2.1503

22.93

2.1283

22.64

Sales growth

0.0019

5.86

0.0020

6.23

0.0022

6.65

Industry performance

0.2916

14.68

0.2897

14.53

0.2921

14.63

Adj R-Sq

0.5477

0.5467

0.5516
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Table 10. Regression of firm performance on CFO compensation structure (continued)

Panel B: Variance/covariance matrix of coefficient estimates from Model (5)

Intercept
CFO Bonus
CFO Options
CEO Bonus
CEO Options
Log Firm Size
Leverage
BTM
FCF
Sales growth
IndTobinQ

Intercept
0.00424
-0.00001
-0.00014
-0.00020
-0.00009
-0.00017
-0.00081
-0.00082
-0.00169
0.00000
-0.00101

CFO
Bonus
-0.00001
0.00654
0.00045
-0.00427
-0.00028
-0.00001
0.00004
-0.00008
0.00020
0.00000
-0.00003

CFO
Options
-0.00014
0.00045
0.00132
-0.00034
-0.00042
0.00000
0.00010
0.00009
-0.00006
0.00000
0.00000

CEO
Bonus
-0.00020
-0.00427
-0.00034
0.00628
0.00040
0.00001
-0.00002
0.00002
-0.00016
0.00000
0.00003

CEO
Options
-0.00009
-0.00028
-0.00042
0.00040
0.00093
-0.00001
0.00009
0.00009
-0.00017
0.00000
0.00001

Log
Firm Size
-0.00017
-0.00001
0.00000
0.00001
-0.00001
0.00003
-0.00010
-0.00001
-0.00005
0.00000
0.00001

Leverage
-0.00081
0.00004
0.00010
-0.00002
0.00009
-0.00010
0.00169
0.00021
0.00105
0.00000
0.00022

BTM
-0.00082
-0.00008
0.00009
0.00002
0.00009
-0.00001
0.00021
0.00060
0.00085
0.00000
0.00017

FCF
-0.00169
0.00020
-0.00006
-0.00016
-0.00017
-0.00005
0.00105
0.00085
0.00875
0.00000
0.00000

Sale
Growth
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

Ind
TobinQ
-0.00101
-0.00003
0.00000
0.00003
0.00001
0.00001
0.00022
0.00017
0.00000
0.00000
0.00039
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Table 11. Robustness check
Panel A: Use of EPS as firm performance measure
This table shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on CFO compensation
structure. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by EPS. Main independent
variables are CFO Bonus Portion and CFO Options Portion. Control variables are CFO Base
Salary, CEO Bonus Portion, CEO Options Portion, and other firm/industry specific variables.
Variable definitions and measures are in table 7.

Variable

(5.1)
Coef.

t Value

Dependent variable: Firm performance (EPS)
-1.9789

-4.87

CFO Bonus Portion

0.1713

0.34

CFO Options Portion

0.5710

2.52

CEO Bonus Portion

0.5040

1.02

CEO Options Portion

0.3402

1.78

Firm size

0.5739

17.68

Firm leverage

-1.4157

-5.51

Book to market ratio

-0.9454

-6.20

Free cash flows

9.8696

16.89

Sales growth

0.0123

5.90

-0.6316

-5.09

Intercept

Industry performance
Adj R-Sq

0.1212
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Table 11. Robustness check (continued)

Panel B: Test for multicollinearity
This table shows the collinearity diagnostics among regressors of Model (5) using tol, vif and
collin options.
Collinearity Diagnostics
Proportion of Variation
Eigen

Condition

CFO

CFO

CEO

Number

value

Index

Intercept

Bonus

Options

Bonus

1

6.3035 1.0000

0.0003

0.0028

0.0046

0.0023

...

2

1.4705 2.0704

0.0000

0.1107

0.0471

0.1212

...

3

1.0697 2.4275

0.0003

0.0260

0.0986

0.0465

...

4

0.7331 2.9323

0.0000

0.0130

0.1540

0.0100

...

5

0.4585 3.7079

0.0000

0.0696

0.5360

0.0498

...

6

0.3807 4.0689

0.0000

0.0093

0.0294

0.0123

...

7

0.2637 4.8894

0.0000

0.7658

0.1162

0.7560

...

8

0.1832 5.8656

0.0001

0.0008

0.0002

0.0001

...

9

0.0991 7.9769

0.0067

0.0015

0.0096

0.0000

...

10

0.0292 14.6972

0.0039

0.0005

0.0024

0.0003

...

11

0.0089 26.5889

0.9886

0.0001

0.0021

0.0015

...
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Table 11. Robustness check (continued)

Panel C: GLM and Maximum Likelihood technique
This panel shows the results of generalized linear model of the relationship between CFO pay
structure and firm performance using maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is
firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables are CFO pay structure
measured by CFO bonus portion and CFO options portion. Control variables are CEO pay
structure and firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and measures are in table 7.

Variable

Coef.

p Value

Dependent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q)
Intercept

2.1478

<.0001

CFO Bonus Portion

0.0755

0.3504

CFO Options Portion

0.3393

<.0001

CEO Bonus Portion

-0.1688

0.0330

CEO Options Portion

0.2340

<.0001

Firm size

-0.0431

<.0001

Firm leverage

-0.5332

<.0001

Book to market ratio

-1.1538

<.0001

Free cash flows

2.1114

<.0001

Sales growth

0.0020

<.0001

Industry performance

0.2916

<.0001

76

Table 11. Robustness check (continued)

Panel D: Panel regressions
This table presents the results of panel regressions of firm performance on CFO compensation structure. The models are one-way fixedeffect (5.3), one-way time fixed-effect (5.4), two way fixed effect (5.5), one-way random-effect (5.6) and two-way random-effect (5.7).
The dependent variable is firm performance. Variable definitions and measures are in table 7. Tobin's Q is dependent variable.

Variable

Fix one (5.3)

Fixonetime(5.4)

Fix two (5.5)

Ran one (5.6)

Ran two (5.7)

Coef.

t Value

Coef.

t Value

Coef.

t Value

Coef.

t Value

Coef.

t Value

2.7884

8.90

2.0155

23.25

3.2245

9.86

1.4689

12.69

1.4613

12.29

-0.1099

-1.38

0.0257

0.26

-0.0820

-1.03

-0.0939

-1.22

-0.0811

-1.04

CFO Options Portion

0.1553

4.77

0.3063

7.16

0.1742

5.36

0.1893

5.95

0.2017

6.24

CEO Bonus Portion

0.1078

1.29

-0.1731

-1.74

0.1080

1.30

0.0505

0.63

0.0323

0.40

CEO Options Portion

0.1415

5.05

0.2040

5.69

0.1615

5.76

0.1687

6.17

0.1795

6.47

Firm size

-0.3018

-10.12

-0.0316

-4.83

-0.3812

-11.74

-0.0565

-4.94

-0.0566

-5.11

Firm leverage

-0.5404

-5.49

-0.5232

-9.65

-0.4821

-4.84

-0.4049

-5.57

-0.3714

-5.14

Book to market ratio

-0.5346

-17.05

-1.1263

-33.78

-0.5167

-15.92

-0.6990

-23.87

-0.7025

-23.12

Free cash flows

1.7114

11.49

2.4252

18.31

1.7998

12.07

2.0653

15.52

2.1538

16.03

Sales growth

0.0002

0.70

0.0013

2.83

0.0008

2.40

-0.0002

-0.75

0.0001

0.30

Industry performance

0.6768

22.52

0.2750

10.52

0.7488

17.93

0.5817

21.77

0.5668

17.64

R-Square

0.8687

Intercept
CFO Bonus Portion

0.5743

0.8704

0.4638

0.3644
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Figure 1. Graph of CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay
Panel A: Years
This panel plots the CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay over years.

Plots of CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay over years
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Figure 1. Graph of CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay (continued)

Panel B: Industries
This panel plots the CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay over industries.
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Figure 2. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables before winsorizing
Panel A: Tobin's Q
This graph plots the value of Tobin's Q before winsorizing process.
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Figure 2. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables before winsorizing (continued)

Panel B: Book to Market
This graph plots the value of Book to Market ratio before winsorizing process.
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Figure 3. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables after winsorizing
Panel A: Tobin's Q
This graph plots the value of Tobin's Q after winsorizing process.
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Figure 3. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables after winsorizing (continued)

Panel B: Book to Market
This graph plots the value of Book to Market ratio after winsorizing process.
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Figure 4. Graph of CEO pay and CFO pay
Panel A: CEO pay and CFO pay over years.

Plots of CEO and CFO pay over years
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Figure 4. Graph of CEO pay and CFO pay (continued)

Panel B: CEO pay and CFO pay over industries.

Plots of CEO pay and CFO mean pay over industries
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Figure 5. Graph of CEO options and CFO options
Panel A: CFO pay structure and CFO pay structure over years.
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Figure 5. Graph of CEO options and CFO options (continued)

Panel B: CFO pay structure and CFO pay structure over industries.

Plots of CEO and CFO options over industries
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